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DDP 1-9409

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Operations School

DATE: 10 October 1955

FROM : Chief Instructor,
War Planning Course

SUBJECT: Final Report - Project USEFUL No. 2

1. Purpose of Project. To provide military officers, selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a need-to-know basis, with an orientation of the organization of CIA, its capabilities, limitations and attendant problems in support of military operations in wartime.

2. Attendance. Thirty senior officers representing all services and widespread commands and staffs (see attached recapitulation).

3. Date Held and Place. 19 September through 30 September on a 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. schedule in the CIA Orientation Room, 117 Central Building.

4. Method of Instruction. Guest lecture with discussion periods following major subjects covered. Thirty-two lecturers representing the Offices, major staffs and divisions of the DDP and DDS presented instructional material. The Acting DCI and the DDP also appeared on the schedule.

SUMMARY

The purpose of the course was fulfilled, according to the student critiques, although the Agency was criticized for presenting an emphasis on CIA's limitations rather than capabilities. It is felt that a good part of this criticism was overcome by [REDACTED] closing remarks on 30 September when he presented a clear picture of Agency capabilities in Staybehind Activities. It is unfortunate that this came after the student critiques had been submitted. Several students remarked that their opinions had changed following his talk.

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The majority of students felt that the course can be condensed to one week. Much of the material they felt was repetitious or vague and could be successfully eliminated. Before the next running I shall attempt to compile a concise one-week course and delete the extraneous material, including all films.

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Several lecturers were singled out for criticism. This criticism was leveled, primarily, at those lecturers from the PP Staff and [REDACTED] of the WE Division. The criticism also gave rise to the suggestion to reduce the length of the course as the students felt the material given them in these lecturers fell into the repetitious and vague categories. [REDACTED] Logistics Planning, was criticised for lecturing on a purely internal CIA problem --- the difficulties between DDP and the Office of Logistics. I am in accord with all of these criticisms and will attempt to correct or delete such lectures in the future.

All students thought the administration of the course (security, badges, dining facilities, place held, etc.) was satisfactory but many complained that much of the value of the course was lost by not being able to take notes. This latter matter has been looked into and cannot be altered.

It is interesting to note that Vice Admiral Charles Chillingworth, Joint Chiefs of Staff representative through whose office this course is set up, attended the course from time to time. Brig. Gen. William Bullock, Chief of Army Psychological Warfare, attended the last day and entered the discussion wholeheartedly.

FINAL REPORT

1. The purpose of the course, to provide military officers with an orientation of the organization of CIA, its capabilities, limitations and attendant problems in support of military operations in wartime, was accomplished successfully according to student critiques.

2. The primary criticism leveled against the course in accomplishing this mission was the tendency to stress our limitations to get things accomplished rather than a more positive approach stressing our capabilities. This same criticism had been leveled against PROJECT USEFUL No. 1. This is valid in part. In an effort to place the facts before this group these facts would appear rather depressing. On the other hand, the military planner thinks continually in terms of a positive approach culminating in ultimate victory. Yet the G-2 of a staff thinks just as we. So this criticism of a "negative" approach is not entirely valid. Secondly, this course stressed our planning to support the military. Much of the emphasis on limitations emanates from a lack of clear-cut policy and doctrine regarding CIA's role in support of the Military. This in turn, is dependant on a further education of the military so that the old merry-go-round of "what do you want done?" will eventually cease. It is felt that much of the criticism was obliterated in the last hour of the course when [REDACTED] gave an excellent presentation of our present capabilities based on current

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Staybehind Operations. It is unfortunate that this presentation occurred after the students had submitted their critiques, but many students approached me and said the talk had changed their opinion of CIA's present capabilities. I believe that this talk by [REDACTED] should be incorporated into the course at an earlier stage.

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3. A second fact emerges from the above criticism. Although the students were here to learn of our capabilities to support the military in wartime, it was very evident that they possessed a great deal of interest in what we were doing, currently, to win the Cold War and prevent a Hot War. I think that serious consideration should be given to extending that portion of the course on current Cold War Planning and incorporate, to the extent feasible, some material on current operations.

4. The majority of the students felt that the course could be reduced to a concise one-week orientation. Their primary objection to the present length was based on presentations in the second week. They felt that the majority of the material, as presented, was repetitious, vague and inconclusive. In particular, that presented by the PP Staff of DDP. I am in agreement. Unless the PP Staff can present concrete, concise facts this portion should be eliminated since the material, as presented by them, had already been covered by [REDACTED] and others. In addition, one of the PP instructors continually spoke of "my opinion" when discussing his subject from a policy and doctrine staff. This was in direct opposition to a written statement I had made to that Staff that military personnel are NOT interested in personal opinions but in the Agency policy, doctrine and teaching. [REDACTED] Chief of WE Division was also criticised for a vague and indefinite approach to his subject. This, I believe, was occasioned by his vague references to countries without names, to general activities and to an unfortunate lack of knowledge of certain planning negotiations concerning the Department of Defense and ourselves. This latter fact became quite evident when some of the Defense officers involved in these negotiations put questions to [REDACTED]. I believe that this deficiency can be solved if I can convince [REDACTED] to give the same specific talk he has given to the War Planning Course. On the other hand, we were complemented for the honesty, frankness and humility with which we presented the CIA problems and solutions.

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5. [REDACTED] Chief of Logistics Planning, was criticised for his presentation. This was warranted. His talk was strictly an internal one. The entire talk was based on Logistics troubles with DDP and not on Logistic support of UW. The students liked his delivery, but felt that we should "not wash our dirty linen" before them.

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6. The students seemed to think that this course should be given in some form to the higher level Service Schools. As opinion was so divided in this respect, I believe that this should be shelved until a later date and the question omitted from future critiques. More can be gained on this subject from [REDACTED] after he has presented his material at some of the schools this fall.

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7. The administration of the course appeared satisfactory to all students. The only criticism in this regard was their inability to take notes. This matter has been investigated and cannot be changed. For my own part, I desire to hold the next running of the course in the auditorium [REDACTED] Central Building, although comfortable and plush, presents too many problems and introduces elements of the Office of Training who have no reason or interest in this course.

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8. It is interesting to note that Vice-Admiral Charles Chillingworth, Chief of the Joint Subsidiary Activities Division of the JCS, appeared from time-to-time and remained for the entire session each day. Since his is the office that negotiated the original orientation, I am endeavoring to obtain his reaction to the course. Brigadier General William Bullock, Chief of Army Psychological Warfare attended on the last day and entered the discussions.

9. In conclusion, I feel that the course accomplished its purpose, but I am not at all satisfied with it. It needs considerable tightening. I propose to work on a one-week course and discuss it at length with [REDACTED] before the next offering (which, I presume, will be a year from now). Looking at the entire two weeks in retrospect, I feel that the course "shot its bolt" in the first week. We delved into the lesser problems too much. Officers, at the level these represented, are more concerned with the major problems we face and the major steps we are taking. I believe this can be presented successfully in one week.

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